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Abstract: Forecasting social phenomena can, in many ways, be difficult. The reason is that it is the na-
ture of these phenomena to be closely and multilaterally linked with physical, biological, and other so-
cial phenomena. The main aim of this article is to present selected problems related to futurology.
Although various research methods are presented in this text, the main focus was put to heuristic meth-
ods (their development, rules, ways of application ect.).
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F
orecasting is associated with forms of programming, of planning the future,
where the determinants of a phenomenon can be analysed quantitatively (for
example, in economics, statistics, and demographics) and testability is expected to
be relatively high. For many advocates of a purely scientific attitude to the future,
especially before the 1990s, forecasts, and so scientific predictions with a high de-
gree of testability, can be academically acceptable, whereas any other predictions
are to them only a trip to the future in a vehicle driven by wild fantasy. They do
admit, however, that prognology serves to improve methods of planning and man-
agement, which indirectly means challenging other forms of prediction, especially
in politics and culture, where the necessity for predictions is obvious. Many leading
academics remain wholly convinced that only quantifiable forecasts are acceptable,
and this is why Weber argued that any forms of prediction in the social sciences
were impossible, by which he indirectly suggested that we should not create any
future designs or attempt to visualise our future, which in turn questioned the legit-
imacy of taking account of hope, fears, and dreams (Sepkowski, 2005, p. 65).
Forecasting is understood as predicting based on specific trustworthy data. Futur-
ology, in turn, is the science of predicting the future. The purpose of scientific forecasting
is to show a vision (model) of the future in the most probable way that the phenomenon
under investigation will develop, including the directions and dynamics of its develop-
ment. In the course of forecasting, we also aim to determine the conditions for the evolu-
tion of the analysed phenomenon. A forecast prepared for this purpose must take account
of the known relationships, types, and intensity of external influences and internal
changes expected in the development of the phenomenon (Stryjski, 2003, p. 1). The term
forecast should be understood as a ‘a judgment based on scientific research practices, re-
lating to a specific future, not the future in general; verified empirically; uncertain, yet ac-
cepted, or reliable, credible, and plausible’ (Guzik, Appenzeller, Jurek, 2004, p. 7).
As rightly noted by Stryjski, forecasting social phenomena can, in many ways, be
difficult. The reason is that it is the nature of these phenomena to be closely and multilat-
erally linked with physical, biological, and other social phenomena. Thus, making judge-
ments about the future course of social phenomena, which, unlike physical phenomena
based on “strong” science, are dependent on a large number of factors with varying de-
grees of stability, is a complex task. It should also be added that it is rarely possible to
carry out experiments on a social phenomenon. All this makes the basis for predicting the
future course of social phenomena weak – in this case, the forecast itself is a social phe-
nomenon that, together with others, may influence forecasting in various ways (Stryjski,
2004, pp. 30–31).
Predicting social phenomena (especially in a global sense) is hindered (limited) by:
1. the qualitative character of social science laws (formulated at a high degree of general-
ity); 2. the Oedipus effect – predicting triggers action that accelerates the predicted effect;
3. the syndromatic nature of social phenomena – the phenomena that we study occur in
certain wholes, often heterogeneous. Man and his behaviour as the object of study is
a bio-psycho-socio-cultural being, so his behaviour is guided by genes, brain, and educa-
tion (culture). The premise of predictions has to be laws of different nature, such as an-
thropology, psychology, sociology, and philosophy; 4. the evolving nature of social
reality – the reality we live in is changing radically. The demands of history require that
new general knowledge be complemented by new information about new epochs. There-
fore, general knowledge has little relevance, in itself it must be saturated with new infor-
mation. Consequently, in order to continue to predict, new concrete historical knowledge
must be taken into account (Materials).
The latter problem is very much like panta rhei ‘everything flows,’ the phrase uttered
in antiquity by Heraclitus of Ephesus. You cannot enter twice into the same river. The
only constant phenomenon in the world is change. The environment in which people live,
businesses operate, and regional and government policy is conducted, changes. All these
changes make the conditions under which decisions, especially strategic ones, are taken
increasingly unpredictable and complex. The dynamics of change are increasing and the
degree of difficulty in adapting to them is changing, too. The desire to learn about future
phenomena and explore potential opportunities constantly accompanies man’s profes-
sional and personal life. To satisfy that desire, people are still trying to develop effective
methods of studying the future in order to best prepare for the unknown (Borodako, 2009,
p. 7).
Sepkowski indicates that few experts in forecasting would bow to Lech Zacher, for
whom it is necessary to take account of irrational and accidental elements, catastrophes,
accidents, failure to perceive linearity, continuity of phenomena, and processes in time,
because this is one of the most serious barriers to the exploration of the future. According
to the theorist, this is not easy, but we canmanage, using chaos theory, catastrophe theory,
or fuzzy logic, which requires interdisciplinary studies and close co-operation between
specialists, on an assumption of openness to other sciences, which is possible only in in-
stitutions exclusively engaged in prediction, which has repeatedly been stressed by the
“Poland in the 21st Century” Forecast Committee (Sepkowski, 2005, p. 67).
It should be mentioned here that the future can be predicted in a scientific way, when
we use proven methods and scientific tools; in a rational way, when we rely on experi-
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ment, without the use of scientific methods; or sometimes an irrational manner, when we
rely on fortune-telling, prophecy, or intuition, and such methods do not necessarily have
to be false more often than rational ones (Sepkowski, 2005, p. 65). As a side note, there is
a problem of interest not only to theorists. It is assumed that action is rational if it is based
on rational knowledge. There is, however, substantive rationality andmethodological ra-
tionality. An action will be substantively reasonable when it is effective, and method-
ologically rational, when it has a real knowledge base. As W. Morawski asks, “Why
should substantive rationality, effectiveness, be based solely on science, and not on other
types of beliefs?” This contradiction will sooner or later call for a correction of the exist-
ing paradigm of knowledge and its understanding. Science deals mainly with discovering
the rules that govern the world around us, the truth about it and about us (Pawnik, 2005).
Forecasting currently offers a couple of types of methods.M. Su³ek shows that, gener-
ally speaking, forecasting as a way to predict the future can be rational or irrational
(Su³ek, 2004, p. 133). A prediction is said to be rational when the process of creating the
prediction is based on logical reasoning; moving from analysis of a set of facts belonging
to the past, or premises (diagnosis phase) to conclusions (future determination phase).
A rational prediction can be scientific (based on scientific principles) or common-sense
(based on experience). An irrational prediction occurs when the premises are not stated,
and/or the relationship between the premise and the conclusion is not respected (Su³ek,
2004, p. 133).
One of the tasks that predicting as a science faces is to fulfil its practical function,
which involves, among others, determining the degree of accuracy of a prediction. A pre-
diction gains its degree of accuracy from laws derived deductively from statistical laws
relating to specific facts. The components of accuracy of this inheritance are both the de-
gree of the certainty of the truth and the contents of causal, coexistential, and statistical
laws. The forecasting procedure must come from a recognition of the current situation.
The diagnosis of a situation should be sufficiently developed to lay down the current
phase of its fluctuation and the expected succession of future phases. Scientific prediction
that performs a practical function requires development diagnosis, also called predictive
diagnosis. It involves inquiring about the future development of a given process or phe-
nomenon based on the previous phases of partial diagnoses (typological, genetic, mean-
ing, and phase) and their findings. Predictive diagnosis is both a result of these and their
complement, by making inferences mostly from hidden development trends and some-
times also known causal laws (e.g., extrapolation). In both cases, it is probabilistic reason-
ing that leads to uncertain hypotheses, for even hidden development trends are conditioned
by the specific situation of the studied phenomena and processes, and especially the pres-
ence of appropriate regulations and interferences that in international relations – as in all
kinds of social relations – play an important role (Kuku³ka, 2000, pp. 252–253).
Practical prognostic approaches can be divided on the basis of different criteria. Ac-
cording to one division, there are five main approaches: (1) data-oriented (empirical
and experimental-empirical), (2) model-oriented (analytical), (3) combining the first
two approaches, data and models (iterative), (4) goal-oriented (teleological), (5) con-
flict-oriented (dialectical) (Su³ek, 2004, p. 133).
Stryjski, in turn, divided forecast methods into passive and active. The first two be-
low, under subparagraphs 1 to 2, are considered passive, as they are placed primarily in
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the sphere of intellectual and cognitive research, and the third, under subparagraph 3, is
commonly referred to as active, oriented directly to practice. The methods are:
1. Intuitive method. This depends on, for example, brainstorming, a procedure
which is also known as groupthink, a method that occurs, in contrast to the for-
mer, within a dispersed group of people, and variant forecasts, a time horizon,
and the terms of their realisation are sent to the “centre” by post where they are
processed by computer.
2. Research methods, also known as exploratory methods. They combine inferential
prediction with studies of the present. These methods include, among others:
a) Extrapolation of the trend, sometimes called projection. Because of the tech-
niques used and its nature, this method can be used successfully only in the
short term. It is based on two passive assumptions: (1) it assumes a relative
stability of the situation and (2) it is based on the high probability of the po-
ssibility of extending in time current trends and external conditions;
b) Analogy method. This is limited in principle to compiling and comparing
phenomena, processes, and international systems from time periods that are
different, but can be attributed similar or analogous, timeless features, and on
their basis drawing forecast conclusions;
c) Scenario method. This is used primarily when a forecast is drawn in the time
frame for a couple of important elements of a current situation changing si-
gnificantly. Using conditional or complex extrapolation, we create variant
scenarios (models) of the predicted development of a current state;
d) Inferential factor analysis. This depends on setting the direction, methods,
and intensity of the desired changes, doing so on the basis of retrospective
observation and ongoing analysis of the factors accelerating or delaying the
changes (Stryjski, 2004, p. 52).
3. Normative methods, also known as technological methods. They belong to the
aforementioned active methods, directly targeted at the planning or alteration of
reality. They precede such actions as drafting a model of the future and determi-
ning the direction of changes and methods of their implementation in a desired
and predefined manner. Proponents of this method also assume that close coope-
ration between theorists (predictors) and the practices of political life (decision
makers) may in the future lead to the creation of a normative model of reality.
This position rejects not only the case of incidental or fatalistic concepts of the
future, but also the conviction that, having set future goals, we can define (pro-
gramme) effective measures and ways to realise the most theoretical models of
the future (Stryjski, 2004, pp. 52–53).
Heuristic techniques (methods) facilitate creative problem solving (including
futurological), finding new solutions, discovering something new. Their name comes
from the Greek word heurisco, which means “discover”, “find”. Heuristics had its origins
in antiquity. The first, most well-known use of a prototype of the word is credited to Ar-
chimedes. During the famous bath, during which he is said to have discovered the funda-
mental law of hydrostatics (known as Archimedes’ principle), he shouted, “Heureka!”
This was wrongly interpreted as “eureka”, which meant “I have discovered”, “I have
found” (Piech, 2013).
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These techniques rely on the phenomenon in which consciousness uses the services of
the subconscious to associate known facts and the relationships between these facts in or-
der to discover new truths, to formulate hypotheses through independent thinking. The
problem of free will is linked with intuitive decision-making. According to Prof.
S. Pinker, a Harvard University evolutionary psychologist, free will and the personal re-
sponsibility of man for his action associated with it are related to the activity of the brain.
It is a mistake to say that hunger, thirst, and sexual desire result from biology, and reason-
ing, decision-making, and learning are something different, nonbiological. It is just a dif-
ferent variety of biology. Such a biological understanding of human nature does not
threaten equality, freedom, or responsibility. It does not diminish the meaning of human
life, either. What threatens these values more is the belief that man is born a tabula rasa.
Only in this case there is a worry of whether what is written on it is right. The robotisation
of man should not be feared though, because the brain is so complex that there is no threat
that it will be taken over in any way. We are not robots, genetically engineered to only
breed and die. The genes encode the potential of themind, which allows us to create an in-
finite number of ideas and behaviours. This ensures that our humanity has unlimited pos-
sibilities. The possibilities themselves, however, are not encoded in the genes. The
neurological and psychological processes occurring in the brain when making difficult
decisions have always fascinated scientists. One of the experts in this field is Prof.
Damasio of the American University of Iowa, who specialises in questions related to
so-called emotional intelligence. The case of Elliot, a lawyer who as a result of the activ-
ity of the brain lost the ability to recognise his emotions, went down in history due to
A. Damasio’s study. In a short period of time, the decisions taken by Elliot brought him
to total ruin. He lost his fortune, his wife left him. It turned out that without emotions, we
are not able to truly manage our lives. Prof. Damasio, together with researchers fromHar-
vard University and the California Institute of Technology, decided to examine deci-
sion-making processes by people whomight have impaired emotional responses. For that
reason, a group of specially selected people were put in a situation where they had to
choose between the life of a loved one and the so-called common good. Six people who
were invited to participate in the experiment had had a portion of nerve tissue in the
mid-ventral prefrontal cortex removed during neurological surgery. The treatment had
not adversely affected their intelligence, ability to think logically, or consciousness. The
experiment also included 12 patients with other brain injuries and 12 healthy people.
With the help of functional magnetic resonance imaging, CT scans, and a special com-
puter program, Brainvox, the researchers created three-dimensional, detailed maps of the
brains of the volunteers, in particular the region of the ventral premotor cortex (the
so-called VPMC) that they were interested in. This is connected to the frontal cortex,
which is responsible for complex mental operations, including the sense of morality, and
to the brain stem, the structure that controls the body’s physiological responses to emo-
tional stimuli. In the crucial phase of the study, the researchers confronted the volunteers
with a number of situations that required difficult decisions. The situations differed in de-
gree of difficulty, some of which did not require much effort, others were simply heart-
breaking. Each of the participants had to choose one answer: During an escape attempt,
would you leave a child behind to get rid of the extra ballast?, Would you kill your own
child to save twenty other people?, Or, would you kill a friend with AIDS, if you knew
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that they would infect other people thereby sending them to death? The results of the
questionnaires were shocking. People who had had the VPMC removed behaved ex-
tremely coolly in situations that should have unleashed in them a deep moral crisis. With-
out batting an eyelid, they were willing to sacrifice the lives of their loved ones for the
greater good, or to save the group. “Most people with a healthy brain are in such a situa-
tion torn internally, are in crisis. Our patients did not have this kind of dilemma, they were
free from any distractions, emotional suffering,” said Prof. Damasio (Minta, 2013).
Heuristic methods are usually presented as a set of methodological principles, ap-
proaches/tips, efforts, etc., without a clearly defined code of practice. Creating one that
fits, according to the conditions of the problem or the phase of finding a solution, is
treated as a heuristic process when solving a problem (Penc, 2008, p. 449).
The history of the development of heuristics can be, as noted by Piech, summarised as
follows: (1) a period of philosophical activity in antiquity; (2) a period from the Middle
Ages to early modern times, when the first attempts were made to create heuristics, with
ars inveniendi, art of discovery, discovering the learning process, universal rules that
made scientific discoveries possible; (3) the fifties and sixties, a period of the domination
of the belief that it was impossible to create a system that would guarantee scientific dis-
coveries, that the goal should not be to discover universal methods, but individual heuris-
tic rules that based on experience simplified the process of finding a solution; (4) the
seventies, a period of tests that led to order in unclear sets of rules so that they could be
useful to a greater extent for the purposes of scientific research; (5) the eighties, a period
of disappointment with the lack of the effective use of heuristic methods, also due to
a higher interest in the rapidly increasing computational capabilities of computers and
their accessibility (in terms of their price and ease of use), (6) nineties, the years of the
“hidden” development of heuristics as a method and technique used in computer software
and in applications of artificial intelligence (Piech, 2013).
Thus, the term heuristics has come a long way in history. Heuristic methods are in-
creasingly being used not only in philosophy, teaching, psychology, and logic, but also in
management andmarketing, in economic theory, applications of mathematics in econom-
ics, but especially in technologies, including advanced software solutions used in com-
puters (Piech, 2013). It would therefore be good, if these methods were used by broadly
understood humanists in their studies.
Su³ek is right, that for many years in the social and technical sciences (especially eco-
nomics) heuristic methods were considered synonymous with creative (non-routine, un-
conventional) methods, as opposed to routine (algorithmic) ones. Currently, this division
is losing importance – on the one hand, to develop an algorithm requires creative think-
ing, but on the other, heuristic algorithms are developed. Heuristic methods and reason-
ing use analogy, induction, and some universal procedures – objectives and measures
analysis, planning, and others (Su³ek, 2010, pp. 80–81).
Piech seems to be a supporter of the separation of these concepts. He pointed out that
a best solution is possible in the case of deterministic methods, but with heuristic methods
one cannot be so sure. Therefore, there is a huge difference in achieving results through
heuristic and algorithmic means. They are two counter notions. An algorithm can be de-
fined as a procedure leading to solving a problem. This concept is applied in practice in
two senses: (1) a completely mechanical sequence of steps, (2) a general procedure lead-
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ing to a purpose. Heuristics, according to Piech, should be understood in the second
sense, not the first. In line with the meaning of the former, we will always get an answer.
Heuristics, though, does not provide such certainty. An example of the former meaning of
the word algorithm is the algorithms used in mathematics, for example, finding the roots
of a quadratic equation. The latter meaning of the word algorithm is derived from com-
puter science and is a concept of a general code of practice. Thus, any computer program,
nomatter how complex, is in this sense an algorithm. Heuristics is a rule that can be useful
sometimes, but not necessarily always. Such an approach was popularised by G. Polya,
and it is widely used in artificial intelligence for nonlogical reasoning. Thus, the main
difference between the routine approach (using algorithms) and the creative one (using
heuristics) lies in the fact that the former always gives a solution (although the waiting
timemay be very, or even theoretically, infinitely long), while the latter can be unreliable.
Algorithms assume a deterministic approach to the problem, and heuristics, in part, a sto-
chastic one (Piech, 2013).
Depending on the type of heuristic technique, the stages of its construction may differ.
Generally, in the cycle of problem solving the following phases are the most important:
(1) formulating the problem; (2) collecting and analysing information; (3) searching for
ideas; (4) analysing and evaluating the ideas; (5) creating solution projects (alternatives),
(6) turning the solution into reality (Antoszkiewicz, 1982, pp. 18–19).
It is worth mentioning that problem solving, prediction, and the construction of the fu-
ture can, and should, be learnt. This science is based on working out certain practices that
would include both scientific (logical, algorithmic) aspects and creative ones: flashes of
imagination and intuition. We try to establish certain codes of research practice, embed
the solution, and continuously improve it. The solution to a problem should be the result
of cooperation between two independent, linked, and co-creating systems, namely the
solver and the solved. The former involves heuristic and algorithmic methods, a task
force with its personnel and the location of the organisation in existing reality (the task
force, institutions, and other links), providing the task force with the things that they need
(equipment, apparatus), the existing information system in an institution, organisation
and training preparation of the task force for introducing methods of solving the problem,
managing the task force and institution, the climate and culture in the task force and in the
institution and the environment. The latter includes, in turn, the problem with its com-
plexity, conditions and restrictions, including its location in the existing and future real-
ity. Solving any problem requires first identifying them, that is, defining which situations
are problematic and which ones need to be addressed, and then developing variants of
possible solutions containing groups of projects, leading to an improvement or complete
change in the situation, assessing them (in the light of the objectives and resources of the
institution), and selecting the best variant. The selected option, as the final decision,
should be the basis for introducing change (Penc, 2008, pp. 453–455). In heuristic re-
search – though not exclusively – the following methods are used (again, depending on
the type of technique) to select a solution to a problem: consensus, voting, multi-voting,
selection of experts, comparison in pairs, importance ranking, etc. (Muiòo, 2011).
Further issues to be discussed briefly when writing about heuristic methods is the
composition of the research team and the principles that should guide them. The group of
experts should be chosen adequately for the type of heuristic method: it should be univer-
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sal, consisting of people who are all-round and interested in the future, and include repre-
sentatives of specialised areas of study and practice. Moreover, the group should be large
enough to represent various views, and the people selected should think independently
and have an independent vision of the future. However, there are differences as to the size
of the group and its structure. The size of the group of experts depends on the method
(from a few to a few hundred people) (Metody, 2013). Regarding the structure of the
group, it is well known that when people with various views, questioning each other’s
practices come together, creative solutions are born. But what kind of diversity is the ba-
sis for creativity? Researchers at Northwestern University have tried to answer this ques-
tion. The results of their experiment, published in Science Magazine, suggest that
diversity is necessary for action to be creative. But this is not about race, gender, or back-
ground. The researchers compared teams that had succeeded with ones that had not. They
analysed the composition of the groups to determine what the differences between them
were. They took into account research project teams from several disciplines (including
the arts). It turned out that the teams that had the greatest success were characterised by
two features. First, they were diverse, made up of experienced people and novices. This is
nothing new – the need for “new blood” has long been regarded as an important compo-
nent of success. Less obvious was the other criterion of success. The common denomina-
tor in all winning teams was having at least a few experienced actors who had never
before worked together. As stated by L. Amaral, a physicist at Northwestern University
and the co-author of the study: “People have a tendency to want to work with their friends
– people they’ve worked with before. And that’s the problem.” (Guterl, 2005).
Researchers, when dealing with brainstorming, should especially follow the five key
principles developed by A. Osborne: (1) deferred judgement principle – ideas are not as-
sessed during the first phase of the session; (2) modification principle – if a solution sug-
gested by someone seems good, it is adopted; (3) fantasising principle – even the most
crazy and unrealistic idea can be transformed into something good; (4) suggestion princi-
ple – repeating others’ ideas is not a bad thing, on the contrary, it is encouraged; (5) the
principle of the transformation of quantity into quality – the more ideas, the bigger the
chance of finding the optimum solution (Kowalczyk, 2005).
In the literature on the subject, there currently are dozens, if not hundreds, of different
heuristic methods. Due to the limited size of this article, only a few of them will be pre-
sented below (called simply heuristic, or based on research principles relying on intu-
ition), divided into four groups (Antoszkiewicz, 1982, pp. 17–18):
1. Deferred judgement methods [assume that man is capable of creative activity,
and the results of this activity depend on how they are used; the basic premise is
a collective search for new ideas (Marsza³kowska, 2013)]: one-person brainstor-
ming, mixed brainstorming, classic brainstorming, circle brainstorming, brainstor-
ming with breaks; brainstorming – “the most crazy idea” version, brainstorming
– “stimulus trigger” version, e-storm, storyboarding, simultaneous evaluation,
Philips 66 Buzz Session, 635, metaplan, “snowball” method, task tables, stimu-
lation, jumping in the level of topic generality, gradually defining the problem
(Kowalczyk, 2005);
2. Transposition methods [come to detect a conflict between two mutually exclu-
sive claims or on a conscious and forced search for similarities between events,
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solutions in order to learn and use information (Marsza³kowska, 2013)]: contra-
dictions, functional analysis, Gordon’s analogies; problem reversal, comparison,
CERMA methods, MIDE (Method of Integration and Disintegration of Ele-
ments), PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique), CPM (Critical Path
Method), Monte Carlo method, MCTS {Monte-Carlo Tree Search} (Monte-Car-
lo, 2013) etc.;
3. Suggestion methods [are used for research into realising or adapting an existing
process (phenomenon) to a new situation, the essence of these methods is sugge-
sting, flipping, opposing, trying using a set of questions (Marsza³kowska, 2013)]:
crushing, playing with words, superposition, information packs, guiding qu-
estions, Polya’s method, critical analysis and evaluation, EM-ES-ER solution ne-
twork (Stachowski, 2013), pros and cons, heuristic tips, etc.;
4. Complex methods [a common feature is that they help to create and upgrade
products, or technological or production processes; are used in solving the most
difficult and complex problems in situations established by the tradition and tre-
ated as indisputable; the idea of these methods is based on creative thinking, de-
stroying, creating, and perfecting (Marsza³kowska, 2013)]: synectics, ARIZ
(Algorithm for Inventive Problems Solving), TRIZ {Theory of Inventive Pro-
blem Solving} (Andrzejewski, Jadkowski, 2013), ANKOT (Contrast Analysis of
Technical Objects), morphological box, Delphi method, techniques of creative
thinking, lateral thinking, de Bono’s Six Thinking Hats (Urban, 2013) etc.
This division should be treated conventionally, because each heuristic method is used
to achieve specific results and requires modification to the problem or the phase of its so-
lution, as this affects its efficiency and effectiveness (Antoszkiewicz, 1982, p. 13).
Heuristic methods are not, as has already been mentioned, without faults. J. Galtung,
a Norwegian mathematician, sociologist, and futurologist, noticed that the vast majority
of forecasts formed in the seventies for the year 2000 proved to be wrong. According to
him, experts are reluctant to voice views that differ from a generally accepted discourse or
perception of a particular issue. Galtung believes that if experts provide decision-makers
with prognostic information within a generally accepted trend, they will continue to be
treated as experts. If, however, they present a new discourse and do not fit in the current
discourse context, they will be called pioneers or prophets, and they are not likely to
achieve acceptance in the eyes of the decision-makers (Su³ek, 2010, p. 83).
Another thing to keep in mind – though that does not mean that we should stop looking
for regularities – is that the world, nature, life are inherently undetermined. C. Morel
(French sociologist, former director of human resources at Renault, author of the book Les
Decisions absurdes II. Comment les éviter) stated, “We can endlessly debate the flap of
a butterfly’s wings, but no one is able to articulate it in mathematical equations or predict its
disastrous consequences on the other side of the world. Even so, we obstinately pretend that
science can solve everything. We kid ourselves: We pretend the belief that performing
a multitude of increasingly precise measurements of various parameters will save us from
all dangerous situations and dictate the right decision. But this does not work, and the ex-
cessive belief in rationality entails negative consequences” (W pu³apce, 2012).
It is worth mentioning one more problem associated with heuristic methods. Team-
work, collective thinking, brainstorming, are the mantras of modern business. Increas-
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ingly, however, it turns out that the best ideas come in solitude. Our companies, our
schools, and our culture are in thrall to an idea Cain (the author ofQuiet: The Power of In-
troverts in a World That Can’t Stop Talking) calls the new groupthink. According to this,
creativity and achievement come from an oddly gregarious place.Most of us nowwork in
teams, in offices without walls, for managers who prize people skills above all. Lone ge-
niuses are out. Collaboration is in. However, research strongly suggests that people are
more creative when they enjoy privacy and freedom from interruption. And the most
spectacularly creative people in many fields are often introverts, according to studies by
the psychologistsMihaly Csikszentmihalyi andGregory Feist. They are extrovert enough
to exchange and advance ideas, but see themselves as independent and individualistic.
They’re not joiners by nature (Cain, 2012).
One explanation for these findings is that introverts are comfortable working alone
– and solitude is a catalyst to innovation. As the influential psychologist Hans
Eysenck observed, introversion fosters creativity by “concentrating the mind on the
tasks in hand, and preventing the dissipation of energy on social and sexual matters
unrelated to work.” In other words, a person sitting quietly under a tree in the back-
yard, while everyone else is clinking glasses on the patio, is more likely to have an ap-
ple land on his head. {Newton was one of the world’s great introverts: William
Wordsworth described him as “A mind for ever/Voyaging through strange seas of
Thought, alone.”} (Cain, 2012).
Prof. Su³ek indicates, “The fruits of science are at least two kinds. They are, firstly, ac-
tual scientific achievements, leading to further achievements, to advances in technology.
Secondly, they are in the form of irrational beliefs, ideas, ‘theories’, and ‘superstitions’
under the banner of science. The latter, which could be called poisoned, are possible,
among other things, thanks to the great achievements of true science, which descending
deeper into the matter, comes to discoveries that are more and more difficult to under-
stand and more and more difficult to distinguish from false results. It is so-called
parascience and pseudoscience” (Su³ek, 2004). However, if we put the matter in such
a way, there might be a threat to subordinate science only to practical requirements,
which, incidentally, is by many postulated as the condicio sine qua non of science. This,
in turn, may result in expelling from, or refusing entry to, the “garden of science”, areas
such as classical philologies, prognology, the study of things, etc. The author of the publi-
cation does not claim that everything that we call science automatically becomes it. How-
ever, it should be remembered that, as Stanis³aw Ossowski (Polish sociologist,
methodologist of the social sciences, and cultural theorist) once said, “A researcher is
a man whose professional responsibilities include lack of obedience in thought. This is
his social service, performing his professional duties, not to obey in thought... the synod,
committee, minister, emperor, or Lord. If he is obedient, if his views change at some-
body’s order, he betrays his obligations” (Jeszke, 2011). It is this arrogance, being re-
flected, for example, in action contrary to established schemes and fashions (for example,
the practical application of science), that is the salt of science.
It is worth raising one more issue – the difference in the approach to time (including
the future) in man and ... animals. Although some researchers consider the dilemma (like
irrational forecasting methods) to be irrelevant from the point of view of science, the au-
thor of this article finds it worthy of attention.
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There are various concepts of time. The most popular is the one in which time is an ar-
row (see Figure 1) on which we highlight the process of prediction (interestingly, the pre-
diction of the past, i.e., alternate history). Prediction means making inferences about
unknown events, based on known events (i.e., those that have already occurred and be-
long to the past). Unknown events are those that: occur at a later time compared to the
time of the prediction (1); occur earlier than the prediction and continue in time (2); occur
at an earlier time compared to the time of the prediction and end before the time of the pre-
diction (3).
M. Rowlands in a very exciting book The Philosopher and the Wolf. Lessons from the
Wild on Love, Death and Happinesswrote that “future is something we actually – and not
merely possibly – have now, at the present time (whatever that means). And we have a fu-
ture because we actually have – now – states that direct us towards the future: desires,
goals, projects. Imagine these as arrows streaking into the future. Some of these arrows
direct us into the future only implicitly: it takes time for them to reach their mark. To sat-
isfy a desire, you have to survive long enough for the arrow of that desire to reach its
mark. The desires of wolves and dogs are like this. However, some arrows are different.
Some arrows are burning, ones streaking out into the dark night of the future, and lighting
up that future for us. Corresponding to these arrows are human desires, goals and projects
that direct us towards the future explicitly by way of an overt conception how that future
is to be. Death harms any creature by cutting off the arrow of its desires in their flight. But
death harms most those creatures whose arrows are burning ones. It is by way of these
sorts of metaphors that we humans try to understand time. We think of time as an arrow
whose flight carries it from the past, through the present, into the future. Alternatively, we
might think of time as a river flowing from the past to the future” (Rowlands, 2011,
pp. 245–246). “Or we think of it as a ship sailing from the past, passing through the pres-
ent and heading into a distant and unknown future. We are caught up in this flow of time
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Figure 1. Linear Time
Source: £. Donaj.
because we are temporal beings. Like other animals, the arrows of our desires pull us in,
and allow us to hook on to, this temporal stream. And unlike other animals, our arrows
can, to some extent, light up this stream –making it something to be seen, understood and
perhaps shaped.... The present is forever slipping away – the arrow of time constantly
passing through one location on its way to the next. So, if the meaning of life is tied tomo-
ments, that meaning is also constantly slipping away. The meaning of our life, we think,
must be tied to – must be a function of – our desires, goals and projects. The meaning of
life is something towards which we can progress; something to be achieved. And as with
all important achievements, this is not something that can happen now but only further on
down the line” (Rowlands, 2001, p. 246). “… But if time is a circle rather than a line
(which can resemble the Ouroboros, the ancient Egyptian and Greek symbol depicting
a snake with its tail in its mouth which constantly devours itself and is reborn from itself;
see the earlier part of this publication on the most serious barriers to predicting, including
a linear perception of reality, and Figure 2 – author’s note), if one’s life is destined to re-
peat itself over and over again without end, then the meaning of lives cannot consist in
progression towards some decisive point on the line. There is no such point because there
is no such line.Moments do not slip away – on the contrary, they reassert themselves over
and over again without end. The significance of each moment does not derive from its
place on a line – on how it relates what comes before it on the line to what comes after. It
does not carry the taint of past and future ghosts. Each moment is what it is; each moment
is complete and entire in itself” (Rowlands, 2011, p. 254).
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Figure 2. Circular Time
Idea: £. Donaj, realisation: F. Bia³y.
M. Rowlands concludes that “the time of wolves is a circle, not a line. Every moment
of their life is a closed whole. And they always find happiness in an eternal return to the
same. If time is circular, it has no ultimate end. Thus, existence is not organised around
a vision of the ultimate end.... Where there is no sense of ultimate end, there is no sense of
loss. For a wolf or dog death is really the end of life. And therefore death has no power
over it. This is the essence of being a wolf or a dog” (Rowlands, 2011, p. 255).
The metaphor of the river (understood as a particular river: with no beginning and
with no end, and with no banks) is developed by Z. Sarjusz-Wolski (Ph.D. in economics,
specialist in organisation and management, author of over 200 publications), who in one
of his articles cites several concepts of the future. The first of them, that in a way imposes
itself, is a temporal concept of the future (from Latin tempus “time”). It says that the fu-
ture is simply the time coming. In this case, the place of the river we are currently in is the
present. All the water in front of us is the future and behind us – the past. Another concept
is the space-temporal concept of the future (from Latin spatium “space”), also known as
the “world” of H. Minkowski. According to this concept, the river has no springs or
mouth, but it has banks, and the banks in the present approach each other at a distance
zero. Another concept of the future treats it as a future world or its stretches in terms of fu-
ture things. Hence the name: reistic concept of the future (from Latin res “thing”). Based
on this view, we can say that predicting the future is to describe what will happen in rela-
tion to things. Either in the whole world or (for whatever reasons that interest us) in its
fragments. Another concept is the so-called eventistic concept of the future (from Latin
eventus “event”). This is about events that should be understood as something that could
happen to anything. There are changes, or processes (kinetic events) and states, or dura-
tion (static events). As rightly noted by Sarjusz-Wolski, from the point of view of practi-
cal action by governments, parliaments, parties, businesses, organisations, associations,
citizens, the last concept of the future is the most important. The subject of predictions,
or forecasts are primarily future events. To some extent, these predictions are linked to
the reistic concept of the future, because forecasting and occurring events will shape
the world of future things. However, their starting point is predicting these events
(Sarjusz-Wolski, 2005a). The river as a metaphor of the future also appears at the end of
this article.
As rightly pointed out by Prof. Bakke, with subsequent discoveries of the natural sci-
ences and the rapid development of technologies (particularly biotechnology), it becomes
clear that man alone cannot be the active shaper of events, because we work in tandem
with nonhuman beings without which we would not only not be ourselves, but without
whom we would not exist at all (Wykluczeni, 2013). It is worth remembering, especially
when dealing with predicting the future. Because it may be that having only a single – an-
thropocentric – vision of the future, we will not notice other actors of life, including polit-
ical life.
The above-mentioned dilemmas come under the umbrella term posthumanities.
This is understood as a set of trends and directions of research related to the current
and intellectual and ethical attitude called posthumanism. Posthumanities is the human-
ities building knowledge beyond humanism that criticises and/or rejects the central
position of man in the world, therefore its characteristics are any approaches that are
non- or anti-anthropocentric. For that reason posthumanities can be determined as the
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non-anthropocentric humanities, though the term raises concerns over its paradoxical na-
ture. The key research questions are the problem of the limits of species identity, the rela-
tionship between the human and the nonhuman (human relationships with technology,
the environment, animals, things) and issues of biopower, biopolitics, and biotechnology.
The aim of posthumanities is the scientific support and legitimisation of actions designed
to protect various species, as well as “improvement” of the human species (trans-
humanism). Posthumanities is related to the preceding research trends defined as the new
humanities (such as postcolonial studies, gender, queer, ethnic studies, the study of
things, etc.) in so far as they contain elements of posthumanist thinking {for example, in
postcolonial studies which show that animals and things are also subject to various forms
of colonisation, decolonisation, globalisation, exclusion, hybridisation, and therefore
postcolonial studies revealing these processes are an appropriate research field to analyse
these phenomena} (Domañska, 2013).
The world does not seem to be too well prepared for such perception. It is a shame, be-
cause, given the pace of the technological development, it may happen that in the future
heuristics will be reduced to the mechanical reading of our thoughts, dilemmas that after
appropriate “treatment” will be the basis for decisions.
Let us return to the surrounding – still anthropocentric – reality. As indicated by
Sarjusz-Wolski, the mechanism to predict the future is to know and match past events,
relevant to the object of forecasting, and the regularities between them (type and strength
of cause and effect relationships), and to draw conclusions about the occurrence (or
non-occurrence) of particular future events. The mechanism of prediction can be illus-
trated by the following simple example. Let us say that we have reached a deep wide river
andwant to cross it dry-shod, but there is no bridge.We know, however, that a boat would
allow us to do it (regularity: if boat, then use it to cross water). By serendipity, we have
just discovered one in the nearby bushes (cognition of reality). Based on these premises,
we can already predict that soon we should be on the other side. However, if our informa-
tion about the boat was not complete, that is, if, for example, we did not know that it was
leaking and taking on water, most likely our predictions would prove incorrect. As a re-
sult, we would “end up” somewhere else than we expected (Sarjusz-Wolski, 2005b). Pre-
dicting social phenomena or their development shows (see evolving nature of social
reality) that the problem is not only the boat. The problem is also that we do not know if
the opposite bank of the river exists.
Zeliaœ, an economic prediction theorist, believed that there is no guarantee of creating
reliable forecasts, and we barely pave the way for such diagnoses that prove to be moder-
ately reliable where we have to deal with components of the present that can be analysed
quantitatively and only quantitatively. He was not the only sceptic among many opti-
mists. Adrian Berry, a strong supporter of prospective thinking, went even further, claim-
ing that none of the forecasts prepared at the request of the US Government after World
War II included the most important events that shaped the world, and it is impossible not
to accept his argument, because the only ones were self-fulfilling “forecasts” that were
specific action plans (Sepkowski, 2005, pp. 65–66).
Can – using heuristic methods – we predict what awaits us in the coming years?When
will the world end? Will someone invent a cure for cancer, or will we know the secret of
eternal youth? People have always been interested in the future. Prophets and visionaries
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became the heroes of their time, and the fame of many of them did not decrease even after
their death. To this day, people still are thrilled by the ambiguous predictions of the six-
teenth-century French physician Nostradamus, who allegedly predicted the bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the death of Princess Diana (Kaniewska, 2013, p. 49).
It is worth mentioning contemporary attempts to predict the future. One is the Global
Consciousness Project (GCP), which is an international research program linking re-
searchers that work with devices that can show us possible (noteworthy) effects and
traces of collective consciousness, mainly based on laboratory experiments that showed
the effect of actions of human intentions on a device generating numbers. In the labora-
tory, a volunteer tries to affect the operation of the so-called random number generator
(RNG, a physical device, not a computer program) whose goal is to achieve higher or
lower results. It is sort of throwing a coin in the hope of getting more heads than tails. Ex-
periments involving the RNG have shown that a person can in some (very small, but no-
ticeable) ways impact the result. When we move the same instruments to the field of
interest of the GCP, we can notice that there is also some kind of response to a specific
event in the collective consciousness triggered by joint participation in rituals or ceremo-
nies, or inspired by music or intellectual meetings. A tool of the GCP is a network of sta-
tions located across the planet, collecting random data. They use the same technology and
procedures to carry out experiments. They also have one objective, which is to answer the
question of whether there is a certain regularity in the data obtained coinciding with the
time when a breakthrough happens. Also, the objective is to determine if you can get evi-
dence for the existence of a planetary consciousness, but this is a task that needs many
years of work and findings (Nelson, 2012).
Predictions that fascinated the masses amused scientists. Recently, however, this has
changed. Futurology, until now linked to an esoteric world, now casts its research net
wide – for example, in studies of the future of our planet. “Futurology is a quite young,
but very growing branch of science.Man always looks forward. The future is like a screen
that reflects our dreams and fears.We are fascinated by the unknown, even when it comes
to a prediction of a billion years ahead,” explains Prof. Bostrom, professor of philosophy,
Director of the Future of Humanity Institute. One of the modern futurologists associated
with the Institute is the British astronomer Sir M. Rees, a cosmology theorist, who last
year was awarded the British equivalent of the Nobel Prize, the Templeton Prize
(Kaniewska, 2013, p. 49).
“The Sun formed 4.5 billion years ago, but it’s got six billionmore before the fuel runs
out. But it is not we, people, who will see its end. Probably it will be seen by creatures
similar to us as we are to today’s insects,” said Sir Rees when receiving the award. And al-
though his predictions are much more hard science than the imaginative poems of
Nostradamus, a part of the Future of Humanity Institute’s analysis resembles the futur-
ology from Crichton’s and Lem’s books. I’m not afraid to say it: The next hundred years
is critical for humanity, said Prof. Bostrom, enumerating a list of apocalyptic threats to
modern man: from nuclear annihilation to natural or man-made viruses and bacteria that
exterminate half of the world, to technological dangers such as a nanorobot attack. It is
precisely because of these dangers that futurology is, according to the Briton, essential.
We must look to the future in order to minimise the risk of everyday life (Kaniewska,
2013, p. 49).
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The growing importance of futurology could be related to the fact that many predic-
tions well-known for centuries came true to the letter. The inventions predicted at the end
of the fifteenth century by Leonardo da Vinci such as screw propellers and steam engines
were realised in the following centuries. The English novelist H. G. Wells, the author of
such science fiction classics as The War of the Worlds and The Time Machine, in 1914
predicted that states would fight each other using an atomic bomb. His book later inspired
Leó Szilárd, Hungarian physicist and initiator of the first atomic bomb. Wells himself
gained a reputation as “a visionary of total war.” And, invented by another Englishman,
George Orwell, the slogan “Big Brother is watching you” is not only an element of popu-
lar culture, but also the reality of many streets and buildings with CCTV systems
(Kaniewska, 2013, p. 49).
As the well-known Polish political scientist Prof. Chodubski pointed out, “predict-
ing the future is an important research challenge. It is dictated by both the theory and
practice of life, especially the need to prepare human action for the changing realities of
socio-economic and political life. Visions of the future are a major stimulus activating
any entity seeking to realise certain goals, aspirations; they allow us to concretely and ob-
jectively analyse the contemporary world not only with an eye to the present, but also to
the near and distant time horizon.” In his view, scientific forecasting is always associated
with analysis of a particular reality, the elements of which are: (1) newly emerging and
existing regularities of the development; (2) establishing relevant qualitative factors in-
fluencing regularities of the development of international relations; (3) assessing the con-
ditions and possibilities for further development; (4) formulating bold, yet realistic
forward-looking objectives. Analyses should be carried out comprehensively, that is,
phenomena, dependences, relationships, engagement, interaction, etc., should be identi-
fied (Chodubski, 2012).
The starting point for forecasting is usually experience, observation, common sense, in-
tuition, and authority. These components cannot be overestimated or underestimated. Im-
portant issues in this respect are trust and suspicion. Prof. Chodubski draws attention to the
fact that despite recognition of rational premises in scientific knowledge, in the field of
forecasting emphasis is placed on intuition. It is noted that actors of international relations,
having experience in shaping foreign policy and recognising the aspirations, objectives,
goals of different actors, global and local conditions, and “empathising with” this reality,
undertake to determine the directions of the future. It is a subjective approach to the interna-
tional order. It may give rise to political errors, which result from an individual overview of
a broad spectrum of phenomena and processes. It depends, to an important extent, on the
identity and experience of the entity determining the prognosis. Extensive experience may
lead to a routine overview of processes and phenomena and an underestimation of the rights
of rapid change. Minimal experience, in turn, generates an exterior overview of this reality,
simple trust in the processes of change, enthusiasm. These issues are very controversial in
the implementation of Human Resources diplomatic policy. Opinions whether, in diplo-
macy, experience in the administrative apparatus should count, or whether enthusiasm is
more important for the realisation of certain ideological values in international relations are
conflicting. It has been noted that experienced people usually extrapolate the past into the
realm of the future. Thenwhat is revealed is continuity, stability in relations between states,
nations, and other actors of the international order (Chodubski, 2012).
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Intuition – highly important in heuristics – is an influential orientation in humanistic
studies, but the political science world refers to it dichotomously. On the one hand, it is
criticised as subjective perception of the world, on the other, it is believed to be highly
significant in decision-making by statesmen, who are not able to always refer to expert
opinions on given issues. In general, in a political world that makes decisions both on an
international and international scale it is important to use emotional premises, especially
in ad hoc situations. For decision-makers, intuition replaces the function of advisors and
experts. It is impossible not to agree with the conclusions of Prof. Chodubski who writes
about prediction that: firstly, scientific prognosis is one of the fundamental challenges
and vocations of political science research, including the field of international relations;
secondly: the credibility of scientific prognosis depends on methodological awareness
and its realisation by researchers; thirdly: the state of prognostic research in Poland and in
the world is, in the field of international relations, a reflection of the development reality
of this discipline. Descriptive, instrumental, and ideological functions usually obscure
explanatory and predictive ones in practicing the discipline; fourthly, international prog-
nosis is largely dictated by diplomatic practice; it is expected to formulate forecasts on the
evolution of international relations and operational prognoses, the consequence of which
is referring to intuition, reflection as a method of predicting the future; fifthly, an impor-
tant driving force of modern interest in scientific prognosis is radical, civilisational trans-
formation, including the development of the information society; threats to man resulting
from the scientific and technical development have caused an explosion of futurological
interests, such interests hold a more and more established position in the world of science
(Chodubski, 2012).
To this should be added that, as noted by Michio Kaku, predicting the future is a task
beyond a single person. The scope of human knowledge is simply too broad. In fact, most
forecasts were incorrect because they reflected only the individual point of view of its
creators (Kaku, 2010, p. 9). We can try to prevent this by the use of groupthink.
Literature
Andrzejewski G., Jadkowski K., TRIZ – metoda interdyscyplinarna, http://www.knws.uz.zgora.pl/
history/pdf/knws_05_andrzejewski_g.pdf, 28.04.2013.
Antoszkiewicz J. (1982), Metody heurystyczne, Warszawa.
Bakke M. (2010), Posthumanizm: cz³owiek w œwiecie wiêkszym ni¿ ludzki, in: Cz³owiek wobec natury
– humanizm wobec nauk przyrodniczych, ed. J. Sokolski,Warszawa.
Berry A. (1997), Nastêpne 500 lat, Warszawa.
Borodako K. (2009), Foresight w zarz¹dzaniu strategicznym, Warszawa.
Cain S. (2012), Filozof mieszka w jaskini, NYT Synd., 2012, in: “Forum” 18–24.06.2012.
Chaotyczna harmonia œwiata. O teorii chaosu, demonie Laplace’a, kobiecie jako uk³adzie niesta-
bilnym i Bogu, który nie gra w koœci (2005), conversation with Prof. Micha³ Tempczyk,
conducted byS.Mizerski, “Niezbêdnik Inteligenta”, supplement to “Polityka” no. 11, 19.03.2005.
Chodubski A., Prognostyka jako wyzwanie metodologiczne w badaniu stosunków miêdzynarodowych,
“Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sk³odowska Lublin – Polonia”, vol. XVI, 2 sectio K
2009, at: www.geopolityka.org, 17.08.2012.
PP 3 ’13 Futurology and Heuristics (with Posthumanities in the Background)... 23
Cieœliñski P., Wolna wola jest iluzj¹?, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75476,6582890,Wolna_wo-
la_jest_iluzja_.html, 20.03.2013.
Domañska E., Wprowadzenie do porównawczej teorii nauk humanistycznych (wprowadzenie do
metodologii nauk humanistycznych), http://www.staff.amu.edu.pl/~ewa/Posthumanisty-
ka_2008.htm, 7.04.2013.
Donaj £. (2013), Chosen Problems of Forecasting Social Phenomena, “Reality of Politics. Estimates
– Comments – Forecasts” 2013, no. 3.
Donaj £. (2012), O po¿ytku historii alternatywnej dla politologa. Przyczynek do dyskusji, in: Prze-
sz³oœæ odleg³a i bliska. Studia z zakresu politologii i historii, ed. T. Wallas, Poznañ.
Donaj £. (2012), Problems of Forecasting Social Phenomena on the Example of the Method of Global
Scenario Analysis (Ïðîáëåìû ïðîãíîçèðîâàíèÿ ñîöèàëüíûõ ÿâëåíèé íà ïðèìåðå ìåòîäà
àíàëèçà ãëîáàëüíûõ ñöåíàðèåâ), in: Òåõíîëîãèçàöèÿ ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ïðîöåññîâ â óñëîâèÿõ
ãëîáàëèçàöèè: òåîðèÿ, îïûò, ïåðñïåêòèâû, “Ìèð è Ñîãëàñèå. Ïðèëîåíèå ê æóðíàëó”,
eds. Î. Å. Ãðèøèí, Â. È. Êàìûøàíîâ, Moskwa.
Ekeland J. (1999), Chaos, Katowice.
Galtung T. (2003), What did the experts predict?, “Futures” 2003, no. 35.
Gleick J. (1996), Chaos – narodziny nowej nauki, Poznañ.
Guterl F. (2005), Zbyt zgrana ekipa, “Newsweek” 5.06.2005.
Guzik B., Appenzeller D., Jurek W. (2004), Prognozowanie i symulacje. Wybrane zagadnienia,
Poznañ.
Halpern P. (2004), Na tropach przeznaczenia. Z dziejów przewidywania przysz³oœci, Warszawa.
Jagoda-Sobalak D., Knosala R. (2011), Zastosowanie techniki twórczego myœlenia de Bono w procesie
wdra¿ania metody SMED na przyk³adzie praktycznym, “Zarz¹dzanie przedsiêbiorstwem”
2011, no 2.
Janeczko S. (2005), Wybrane zagadnienia teorii katastrof, Warszawa.
Jeszke J., Nauka w dziejach kultury europejskiej, http://www.amu.edu.pl/~jeszke/uploads/File/Na-
uka%20w%20dziejach%20kultury%20europejskiej.ppt, 8.07.2011.
Kaku M. (2010), Wizje. Czyli jak nauka zmieni œwiat w XXI wieku, Warszawa.
Kaniewska A. (2013), Prorocy w s³u¿bie nauki, “Focus”.
Karwat M. (2009), Syndromatyczny charakter przedmiotu nauki o polityce, in:Demokratyczna Polska
w globalizuj¹cym siê œwiecie – I Ogólnopolski Kongres Politologii, eds. K. A. Wojtaszczyk,
A. Mirska, Warszawa 22–24.09.2009, Warszawa.
Kod umys³u (2207), conversation with Prof. S. Linker, conducted by M. Florek-Moskal, “Wprost”,
26.12.2007.
Kosman M. (1998), O po¿ytku historii dla politologa, “Przegl¹d Politologiczny” 1998, no. 1–2.
Kosman M. (2002), Polityka – historia – politologia, in: Na obrze¿ach polityki. Czêœæ trzecia, ed.
M. Kosman, Poznañ.
Kowalczyk M., Zbiera siê na niez³¹ burzê …mózgów, http://www.gazeta-it.pl/zw/git31/burza_moz-
gow.html, 27.02.2005.
Kuku³ka J. (2000), Teoria stosunków miêdzynarodowych, Warszawa.
Lasoñ P., W zaklêtym krêgu memów, http://horizonofthepossibility.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/w-za-
kletym-kregu-memow-piotr-lason/, 20.03.2013.
Marsza³kowska J., Metody badawcze. Rodzaje i istota, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/130498225/
Metody-badawcze---Zdrowie-Publiczne-WUM-w-Warszawie, 28.04.2013.
Materials about forecasting made available by M. Solak, in the author’s possession.
Metody heurystyczne, http://www.ekonometria.4me.pl/prognozowanie2.html, 28.04.2013.
Minta M.,Mózg wybiera z zimn¹ krwi¹, http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/nauka/artykuly/205098,mozg-wy-
biera-z-zimna-krwia.html, 23.03.2013.
24 £ukasz DONAJ PP 3 ’13
Modelowanie matematyczne i symulacje komputerowe w naukach spo³ecznych (2007), eds. K. Win-
kowska-Nowak, A. Nowak, A. Rychwalska, Warszawa.
Monte-Carlo Tree Search, http://mcts.ai/?q=mcts, 28.04.2013.
Muiòo L. (2011), Zwierzêta (nie ca³kiem) racjonalne, “Focus”, no 09.
Musser G. (2012), Nie wszystko da siê racjonalnie wyt³umaczyæ, “Œwiat Nauki”, no. 12.
Nelson R., Globalny mózg. Generator œwiadomoœci ludzkoœci, http://www.infra.org.pl/wiat-tajemnic/pa-
rapsychologia/1081-globalny-mozg.html, 17.12.2012.
Netz R., Noel W. (2007), Kodeks Archimedesa. Tajemnice najs³ynniejszego palimpsetu œwiata,
Warszawa.
Pawnik W. (2005), Prognozologia stosowana czyli krótka historia foresightu w Polsce, “Unia@Pol-
ska. Niezale¿ny magazyn europejski” 2005, no. 7/8 (122–123).
Penc J. (2008), Encyklopedia zarz¹dzania, £ódŸ.
Piech H. (2006), Rozmytoœæ w grach strategicznych, Czêstochowa.
Piech H. (2005), Wnioskowanie na bazie strategii rozmytych, Czêstochowa.
Piech K. (2013), Wprowadzenie do heurystyki, http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/~kpiech/text/2003-kzif-he-
urystyka.pdf, 25.04.2013.
Pietraœ Z. J. (1998), Decydowanie polityczne, Warszawa–Kraków.
Prognozowanie gospodarcze. Metody i zastosowania (2002), ed. M. Cieœlak, Warszawa.
Projekt Globalnej Œwiadomoœci: zajrzeæ w przysz³oœæ, http://infra.org.pl/nauka/czowiek/274-pro-
jekt-globalnej-wiadomoci-zajrze-w-przyszo, 17.12.2012.
Przeczucie. Omen czy nieszczêœcia? (2008), formulated by: P. Rzeszewicz, “21. Wiek”, no. 1.
Przesz³oœæ odleg³a i bliska: Marcelemu Kosmanowi w szeœædziesi¹t¹ rocznicê urodzin (2000), ed.
K. Robakowski, Poznañ.
Rowlands M. (2011), Filozof i wilk. Czego mo¿e nas nauczyæ dzikoœæ. O mi³oœci, œmierci i szczêœciu,
Warszawa.
Sarjusz-Wolski Z. (2005a), Rzeki czasu. Czas przysz³y niedokonany, “Unia@Polska. Niezale¿ny
magazyn europejski” 2005, no. 5/6 (120–121).
Sarjusz-Wolski Z. (2005b), Skutki przelotu motyla nad Szanghajem, “Unia@Polska. Niezale¿ny
magazyn europejski” 2005, no. 7/8 (122–123).
Sepkowski A. (2005), Cz³owiek a przysz³oœæ, Toruñ.
Stachowski W., Metody organizatorskie w nauczaniu ergonomii, http://www.zie.pg.gda.pl/~wst/ar-
ty/z5pl.pdf, 28.04.2013.
Steward I. (1994), Czy Bóg gra w koœci, Warszawa.
Straffin P. D. (2004), Teoria gier, Warszawa.
Stryjski K. J. (2004), Prognozowanie i symulacje miêdzynarodowe, £ódŸ.
Stryjski K. J. (2003), Prognozy i symulacje miêdzynarodowe, “Studia Miêdzynarodowe. Zeszyty
Naukowe WSSM w £odzi” 2003, no. 1.
Su³ek M. (2004), Metody i techniki badañ stosunków miêdzynarodowych, Warszawa.
Su³ek M. (2010), Prognozowanie i symulacje miêdzynarodowe, Warszawa.
Suski M. (2011), Brednie przepowiednie, in: Scenariusze przysz³oœci. Poznaæ i zrozumieæ cz³owieka,
ed. J. Nikodemska, Warszawa.
Tempczyk M. (1998), Teoria chaosu a filozofia, Warszawa.
Traufetter G., Anatomia b³êdu, http://portalwiedzy.onet.pl/4868,11122,1444219,2,czasopisma.html,
19.10.2007.
Urban T., Kreatywnoœæ: Metoda Szeœciu Kapeluszy, http://pik.ebiznes.org.pl/szesc,6,kapeluszy.htm,
2.02.2013.
PP 3 ’13 Futurology and Heuristics (with Posthumanities in the Background)... 25
W pu³apce decyzji (2012), conversation with Ch. Morel, conducted by F. Gruhier, “Le Nouvel
Observateur”, 14.06.2012, in: “Forum” 2–8.07.2012.
Wykluczeni z historii, conversation with Prof. Ewa Domañska http://www.focus.pl/historia/arty-
kuly/zobacz/publikacje/wykluczeni-z-historii/strona-publikacji/1/nc/1/, 7.04.2013.
Streszczenie
Fututrologia i heurystuka (z posthumanistyka w tle). Wybrane zagadnienia
Prognozowanie zjawisk spo³ecznych bywa pod wieloma wzglêdami utrudnione. Wynika to st¹d, ¿e
w naturze tych zjawisk tkwi silne i wielostronne powi¹zanie z innymi zjawiskami spo³ecznymi; ale nie
tylko – tak¿e fizycznymi czy biologicznymi. Treœci¹ publikacji jest przedstawienie wybranych proble-
mów, z jakimi borykaj¹ siê aktualnie – zw³aszcza w naukach spo³ecznych (w tym tak¿e w naukach poli-
tycznych) – futurolodzy. Choæ artyku³ przedstawia ró¿ne metody badawcze, ich klasyfikacje itd., to
skoncentrowano siê przede wszystkim na metodach heurystycznych: ich genezie, zasadach, sposobie
wykorzystania.
S³owa kluczowe: futurologia, metoda intuicyjna, heurystyka, czas, posthumanistyka
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